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Abstract	
This	study	investigates	the	relation	between	the	length	of	government	formation	and	
electoral	volatility,	party	fractionalisation	and	party	polarisation.	In	order	to	investigate	this,	
the	legislative	elections	in	Netherlands	between	1948	and	2017	are	used.	The	study	utilises	
two	 complementary	 empirical	 strategies.	 Firstly,	 a	 quantitative	 research	 is	 executed,	 by	
employing	a	general	least	squares	regression.	In	this	regression,	the	21	national	parliamentary	
elections	between	1948	and	2017	are	investigated.	In	order	to	discover	the,	partial,	impact	of	
electoral	volatility,	party	fractionalisation	and	party	polarisation	on	the	length	of	government	
formation.	
Secondly,	complementing	 the	approach,	a	most	similar	 system	design	 is	applied	 to	
research	the	causal	mechanism.	This	is	executed	by	doing	case	studies	on	the	2010	and	2017	
elections,	and	on	the	2006	and	2012	elections.	By	performing	this	research,	a	more	in	depth	
analysis	is	made	into	the	government	formation	processes	of	that	time.		
The	 study	 discovers	 that	 both	 electoral	 volatility	 and	 fractionalisation	 have	 a	
substantial	 impact	 on	 the	 length	 of	 government	 formations.	 However,	 the	 study	 also	
discovers	that	despite	the	effect	of	 these	variables,	 it	cannot	be	conclusively	 justified	that	
solely	 these	 variables	 are	 accountable	 for	 the	 changes	 in	 the	 length	 of	 the	 government	
formations.		
	 Keywords:	Government	formation,	electoral	volatility,	fractionalisation,	polarisation	
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Introduction	
After	the	national	election	in	March	2017,	the	longest	government	formation	period	in	
Dutch	 parliamentary	 history	 followed.	 After	 225	 days	 of	 government	 formation,	 the	 new	
government	was	 installed,	 and	 ‘Rutte	 III’	 could	 commence	 its	 term	 (Parlement	&	Politiek,	
2018a).	The	trend	of	longer	lasting	government	formation	periods	has	been	on	the	rise	for	
the	 last	 decades.	 Moreover,	 for	 the	 last	 decades,	 the	 Netherlands	 has	 seen	 a	 more	
unpredictable	party	system.	Just	as	in	many	countries,	the	polls	have	seemed	to	be	unable	to	
accurately	predict	the	outcomes	of	the	elections.	For	example,	in	the	American	Presidential	
elections,	and	the	Brexit	referendum.	
This	 thesis	 will	 attempt	 to	 discover	 what	 factors	 are	 causes	 of	 these	 changes,	 in	 the	
Netherlands.	From	preliminary	research,	it	has	become	clear	that	multiple	factors	can	be	the	
cause	of	the	increase	of	the	duration	of	government	formation;	however,	for	this	research,	
the	focus	will	be	on	three	variables.	These	variables	are	electoral	volatility,	fractionalisation	
of	the	party	system,	and	polarisation	of	the	party	system.	These	variables	are	chosen	because	
in	the	last	decades	there	are	more	seats	that	‘change	colour’,	the	electoral	volatility	increases	
(Mair,	 2008).	 Additionally,	 the	 number	 of	 parties	 that	 manage	 to	 be	 represented	 in	
parliament	 fluctuates,	 thus	 the	 fractionalisation	 of	 the	 parties	 alters	 greatly	 (Taylor	 &	
Herman,	1971).	For	example,	in	the	2017	election,	13	parties	obtained	seats	in	parliament,	
and	 therefore	 the	 number	 of	 seats	 per	 party	 decreased	 (Parlement	 &	 Politiek,	 2018a)	
(Parlement	 &	 Politiek,	 2018b).	 This	 phenomenon	 causes	 a	 more	 fractionalised	 political	
landscape.	Furthermore,	due	to	the	higher	number	of	parties,	the	political	spectrum	becomes	
more	 polarised	 because	 there	 needs	 to	 be	more	 space	 in	 between	 the	 parties,	 for	 party	
competition	to	be	present.	This	causes	the	emergence	of	more	extreme	parties	with	far-right	
and	far-left	ideologies.	(Schmitt,	2016)	
The	 following	 thesis	 examines	 if	 these	 changes	 in	 the	 variables	 correlate,	 and	 if	 they	
influence	 the	 duration	 of	 the	 government	 formation.	 From	 these	 questions,	 the	 research	
question	 for	 this	 study	 is	 composed:	What	 factors	 affect	 the	 length	 of	 the	 government	
formation	of	a	national	government?	
This	question	is	important	to	research	because	it	could	give	insight	in	the	electoral	system,	
voting	behaviour,	and	could	assist	in	the	creation	of	recommendations	on	alteration	of	the	
electoral	 process,	 or	 the	 government	 formation.	 These	 findings	 would	 be	 specific	 to	 the	
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Netherlands;	however,	the	results	could	be	used	to	 investigate	 in	different	countries,	with	
similar	electoral	systems.	
Theoretical	Framework	
From	 the	 period	 after	 the	 second	 World	 War,	 the	 Netherlands	 has	 always	 been	
perceived	as	a	stable	democracy.	Especially	during	the	prime	time	of	the	pillarization,	which	
lasted	until	 the	 end	of	 the	 1960s,	 the	 governments	 that	were	 formed	were	 inclusive	 and	
“relatively	depoliticised”	(Andeweg,	2008,	p.	254).	The	pillarization	ensured	that	the	people	
voted	 according	 to	 their	 faith	 because	 the	 pillars	 were	 categorised	 by	 religion	 (“Roman	
Catholic,	 orthodox	 Calvinist	 or	 secular”	 (Bryant,	 1981,	 p.	 56)).	 Moreover,	 these	 pillars	
contained	not	only	parties,	but	also	schools,	unions,	and	media	outlets	(Bryant,	1981).	This	
strong	 structure	ensured	a	 relatively	high	predictability	of	 the	election	outcomes	because	
people	had	a	high	party	 loyalty.	When,	 in	 the	1960s,	 the	depillarisation	 commenced,	 this	
structure	 disappeared,	 and	 the	 party	 system	 changed	 rapidly	 with	 more	 consequences.	
Among	others,	 three	factors	have	 increased	over	the	following	decades,	as	a	result	of	 the	
depillarisation:	 the	number	of	seats	 that	change	after	an	election	 (electoral	volatility),	 the	
number	of	parties	 that	are	 represented	 in	parliament	 (fractionalisation),	 and	 the	 range	 in	
ideology	of	the	parties	in	parliament	(polarisation).	The	point	of	this	research	is	to	investigate	
if	the	change	in	these	factors	had	an	effect	on	the	duration	of	a	government	formation.	The	
choice	for	the	Netherlands	is	due	to	the	uniqueness	of	the	case.	Maybe	the	phenomena	occur	
in	different	countries	as	well,	but	it	will	be	too	difficult	to	compare	the	Netherlands	to	other	
cases	because	of	 the	difference	 in	electoral	 system	and	party	 system,	which	makes	 it	 too	
complicated	to	control	for	these	alternative	explanations.	
Dependent	variable:	length	of	government	formation.		
As	 discussed	 above,	 the	 concept	 of	 government	 formation	 is	 the	 process	 of	
establishing	a	group	of	parties	that	will	form	the	government,	through	negotiations	between	
party	leaders	(Andeweg,	2008).	However,	this	is	not	the	only	form	of	government	formation.	
American	scholar	Lawrence	Lowell	argued	that	parliaments	need	to	have	two	conditions	to	
have	a	stable	government.	First,	the	government	should	consist	of	one	party,	in	order	to	not	
have	 the	concessions	and	 friction	of	a	multiparty	coalition.	Second,	 the	opposition	should	
consist	of	one	party,	this	to	have	a	proper	execution	of	the	monitoring	of	the	government,	
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and	when	they	become	the	majority	and	form	the	government,	the	first	condition	should	be	
met	again	(Taylor	&	Herman,	1971).	This	is	different	in	the	Netherlands,	as	well	as	in	other	
countries	with	 coalition	 governments.	 In	 coalition	 government	 formations,	 there	 are	 two	
possibilities	 for	 coalitions,	pre-election	coalitions	and	post-election	coalitions.	Pre-election	
coalitions	could	potentially	assist	 small	parties	 to	gain	a	broader	electorate.	This	could	be	
useful	for	parties	to	manage	to	be	elected	into	Parliament,	as	“in	general,	all	electoral	systems	
disadvantage	small	parties”	(Gschwend	&	Hooghe,	2008,	p.	557).	According	to	Sona	Golder	
(2006),	pre-election	coalitions	are	more	likely	to	form	between	parties	that	are	of	relatively	
similar	ideology	and	size;	additionally,	they	are	more	likely	to	form	when	the	party	system	is	
highly	 polarised	 (Golder,	 2006).	 The	 issue	with	 pre-electoral	 coalitions	 can	 be	 that	 voters	
chose	not	to	vote	for	their	desired	party	because	they	dislike	the	coalition	party.	Therefore,	
forming	 a	 pre-electoral	 coalition	 is	 a	 gamble	 for	 all	 the	 parties	 engaging	 in	 the	 coalition	
(Gschwend	&	Hooghe,	2008).		Post-election	coalitions	are	formed	when	it	is	clear	how	many	
seats	 every	 party	 has,	 and	 which	 parties	 have	 similar	 plans	 for	 the	 future.	 Post-election	
coalition	 government	 formations	 are	 often	 a	 long	 process,	 with	 different	 stages,	 it	 is	
important	that	the	process	as	a	whole	is	considered	in	the	Dependent	Variable	(DV).	
For	 the	 last	 century,	 in	 the	 Netherlands,	 and	 many	Western	 European	 countries,	
coalition	governments	have	been	the	norm.	In	a	coalition	government,	the	election	is	merely	
the	 first	 step	 in	 the	 way	 towards	 a	 new	 government	 (Laver	 &	 Schofield,	 2004).	 In	 the	
Netherlands,	the	government	formation	procedure	is	as	follows.	After	the	election,	a	‘scout’	
investigates,	by	order	of	the	parliament,	among	the	parties	what	type	of	coalition	would	be	a	
possibility	to	form	a	government.	This	is	reported	back	to	the	parliament.	After	this	first	step,	
a	new	person	 is	 installed	by	parliament1,	 the	 “informateur”	 (Parlement	&	Politiek,	2018c)	
(Parlement	 &	 Politiek,	 2018e).	 This	 informateur	 then	 attempts	 to	 create	 the	most	 viable	
coalition	of	parties.	In	the	Netherlands,	it	is	common	that	the	biggest	party	is	part	of	the	first	
government	 formation	 attempt.	 In	 some	 cases,	 this	 attempt	 fails,	 after	 which	 often	 the	
informateur	 resigns,	 and	 a	 new	 one	 is	 appointed.	 An	 example	 of	 this	 is	 the	 government	
formation	of	2017,	 in	which	one	of	 the	parties,	GroenLinks,	did	not	want	 to	 continue	 the	
negotiations	(Hoedeman,	2017).	When	a	fruitful	coalition	is	established,	a	new	informateur	is	
																																																						
1	Until	2012,	the	informateur	and	the	formateur	were	appointed	by	the	King.	From	2012,	
the	Parliament	appoints	these	positions	(Parlement	&	Politiek,	2018c).		
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installed	to	help	draft	a	concept	coalition	agreement.	This	is	a	document	in	which	the	main	
issues	and	future	plans	are	presented.	After	the	completion	of	this	document	the	“formateur”	
is	installed,	this	is	usually	the	next	Prime	Minister	(Martin	&	Vanberg,	2003).	The	formateur	
then	 consults	 intended	 ministers	 and	 deputy	 ministers	 to	 form	 a	 cabinet.	 Lastly,	 the	
formateur	proposes	 the	new	government	 to	 the	king,	whom	 installs	 the	new	government	
(Parlement	 &	 Politiek,	 2018c).	 After	 this	 whole	 process,	 a	 coalition	 government	 can	
commence	its	governing	period.	The	coalition	government	can	have	two	different	forms,	a	
minority	government,	or	a	majority	government.	The	Netherlands	has	a	tradition	in	searching	
for	 a	 majority	 government;	 however,	 not	 only	 in	 the	 Parliament,	 but	 it	 is	 considered	
important	 that	 the	 parties	 that	 form	 the	 government	 also	 have	 a	majority	 in	 the	 Senate	
(Andeweg,	2008).	This	additional	difficulty	makes	the	Netherlands,	on	average,	one	of	 the	
most	time	costly	government	formations	in	Western	Europe	(Martin	&	Vanberg,	2003).	This	
lengthy	process	brings	a	problem	to	 the	ability	 to	govern	 the	country	 (Martin	&	Vanberg,	
2003).	For	example,	during	the	formation	period	the	former	government	remains	functional,	
as	‘outgoing	cabinet’,	because	the	country	cannot	be	without	a	government;	however,	this	
government	does	not	take,	or	initiate,	big	policies	decisions	because	it	feels	that	this	is	the	
responsibility	of	the	new	government.	Nevertheless,	the	new	parliament	is	already	installed,	
and	wants	to	continue	governing	the	country.	An	example	is	the	2017	government	formation,	
it	took	225	days	before	the	new	government	was	installed,	which	means	that	the	country	was	
for	2/3	of	a	year	without	an	active	government.		
As	mentioned	before,	this	paper	intends	to	analyse	the	impact	of	three	variables	on	
the	 length	 of	 the	 government	 formation.	 The	 three	 variables	 are	 electoral	 volatility,	
fractionalisation	in	parliament,	and	polarisation	of	the	party	system.	
Independent	variable:	electoral	volatility.	
The	 first	 factor,	which	was	mentioned	 above,	 is	 investigated	 is	 electoral	 volatility.	
Electoral	 volatility	 is	 “the	 net	 change	 within	 the	 electoral	 party	 system	 resulting	 from	
individual	 vote	 transfers”	 (Mair,	 2008,	 p.	 238).	 This	 increased,	 according	 to	 Peter	 Mair,	
because	of	the	very	small	number	of	citizens	that	are	member	of	a	political	party.	In	the	1990s	
this	was	among	the	lowest	in	western	Europe,	with	2.5%	of	the	population	that	was	member	
of	a	party	(Mair,	2008).	This	phenomenon	is	related	to	the	pillars	that	existed	until	the	1960s,	
where	 people	 did	 not	 have	 to	 be	member	 of	 a	 party	 because	 they	were	 in	 such	 a	 social	
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structure	that	it	was	clear	to	what	parties	they	were	affiliated.	In	other	words,	the	increase	in	
utility	 of	 becoming	 member	 of	 a	 party	 was	 too	 small,	 people	 benefitted	 from	 the	 party	
structures	regardless	of	if	they	were	member	of	the	party	or	not	(Bryant,	1981).	For	example,	
from	elementary	school	people	were	already	introduced	into	the	pillar.	However,	when	this	
was	abolished,	the	electoral	volatility	increased,	as	people	did	not	feel	loyalty	to	vote	for	the	
same	party	anymore	(Mair,	2008).	Another	factor	that	has	increased	the	electoral	volatility,	
according	 to	Mair,	 is	 the	party	 system	 itself.	 Because	of	 the	openness	of	 the	Dutch	party	
system,	people	do	not	have	 to	vote	strategically	 to	a	great	extent,	 such	as	 in	a	 two-party	
system	(Abramson	&	Et	al.,	2009).	Mair’s	argument	comes	from	the	notion	that,	because	of	
the	vast	number	of	parties,	people	do	not	have	to	vote	for	a	party	that	is	not	their	preferred	
party.	The	Dutch	party	system	allows	alternative	and	new	parties	to	excel	in	elections,	due	to	
the	lack	of	a	threshold;	therefore,	providing	the	electorate	with	a	wide	variety	of	parties	to	
choose	from	(Mair,	2008).	When	there	is	a	consecutive	trend	of	the	entering	of	new	parties,	
and	with	 that	 a	high	electoral	 volatility,	 it	 can	 lead	 to	party	 system	de-institutionalisation	
(Chiaramonte	&	Emanuele,	2017).	However,	Carina	Bischoff	disagrees	with	this	notion.	She	
argues	that	there	are	two	forms	of	strategic	voting	that	can	increase	the	electoral	volatility,	
seat	maximizing	and	government	maximizing	strategic	voting.	As	the	Netherlands	always	has	
coalition	 governments,	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 people	 vote	 for	 a	 party	 that	 has	 an	 expected	
influence	 in	 the	government	 formation	 (Bischoff,	 2013).	 Even	 if	 this	 is	not	 their	preferred	
party	to	vote	for,	but	close	to	their	convictions	that	they	have	confidence	that	this	party	has	
a	positive	influence	on	the	government	formation	process.	This	does	relate	to	the	earlier	point	
by	Mair,	that	because	of	the	many	parties	 in	the	Netherlands,	people	do	not	have	to	vote	
strategically.	 There	 is	 a	 high	 chance	 that	 there	 are	multiple	 parties	 that	 are	 fairly	well	 in	
representing	a	person’s	ideology,	thus	people	can	easier	switch	between	parties,	if	they	think	
this	will	 be	 better	 for	 the	 government	 formation	 process	 (Bischoff,	 2013).	 An	 increase	 in	
electoral	volatility	is	also	likely	to	cause	a	flow	of	new	members	of	Parliament	(Tavits,	2008).	
When	these	new	members	need	to	participate	in	the	government	formation,	these	could	take	
longer	because	of	the	lack	of	experience	of	the	negotiators.		
Independent	variable:	fractionalisation.		
The	 second	 factor	 that	 will	 be	 researched	 is,	 the	 fractionalisation	 in	 parliament.	
Fractionalisation	is	“the	number-of-parties	with	seats	in	parliament”	(Taylor	&	Herman,	1971,	
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p.	30).	This	definition	does	not	take	into	account	the	number	of	seats	each	party	possesses,	
the	weight	of	the	party,	which	is	attempted	by	multiple	scholars	to	define.	As	Sartori	(1976)	
argued,	when	looking	at	fractionalisation	of	a	parliament,	it	is	only	meaningful	to	investigate	
the	parties	that	have	the	size	to	be	of	importance	in	coalition	formations,	or	to	distort	these	
formations	(Sartori,	1976).	By	looking	at	the	important	parties,	it	could	be	determined	if	the	
parliament	was	effectively	a	two-party,	or	multi-party	parliament	was	(Laakso	&	Taagepera,	
1979).	This	concept	is	important	in	the	process	of	government	formation	because	depending	
on	how	many	seats	each	party	has,	and	the	number	of	parties	in	parliament	there	are,	the	
government	formation	needs	more	parties	to	form	a	majority	government.	The	more	parties	
that	are	involved,	the	more	difficult	they	negotiations	become	(Dalton,	2008),	especially	when	
the	parties	are	ideological	further	apart.	This	ties	into	another	aspect,	cleavages.	Cleavages	
are	the	structural	differences	in	deeply	felt	believes,	for	example,	in	religion,	class,	or	origin.	
As	in	the	Netherlands	there	is	no	threshold	for	parties	to	get	into	parliament,	any	party	with	
enough	supporters	can	enter	after	an	election2.	When	there	are	more	cleavages	felt,	parties	
that	want	to	defend	the	group	arise	(Lipset	&	Rokkan,	1967).	Thus,	by	having	more	clashes	
between	the	cleavages,	fractionalisation	can	increase.		
Independent	variable:	polarisation.	
	 Lastly,	 the	polarisation	of	 the	party	system.	With	 the	 increase	of	parties	 that	have	
seats	in	parliament,	the	polarisation	between	the	parties	often	increases	because	they	have	
to	set	themselves	apart	from	the	other	parties.	Without	party	competition,	there	would	be	
no	reason	to	vote	for	one	party	or	the	other,	determined	by	ideology	(Dalton,	2008).	Anthony	
Downs	argued	that	parties	set	themselves	apart	on	the	left	and	right	continuum.	He	used	a	
spatial	model	for	this	to	display	where	each	party’s	ideology	was	positioned	to	compare	them	
amongst	each	other.	His	premise	was	that	voters	vote	for	the	party	that	is	the	closed	to	the	
voter’s	 ideology	 because	 this	 would	 provide	 them	 with	 the	 most	 utility	 for	 their	 effort.	
According	to	Downs,	in	a	multiparty	system,	parties	would	have	to	move	to	the	side	to	ensure	
the	cleavage	between	the	parties,	which	would	cause	voters	to	vote	for	them	in	elections.	
The	more	parties	would	enter	the	election,	the	more	they	are	obliged	to	move	away	from	
each	other,	and	likely	to	the	extreme	ends	of	the	spectrum.	When	this	occurs	the	polarisation	
																																																						
2	Any	party	that	obtains	more	votes	than	the	complete	number	of	votes	divided	by	150	
seats,	obtains	a	seat	in	parliament.	
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increases,	 which	 therefore	 Downs	measured	 by	 counting	 the	 number	 of	 parties	 (Downs,	
1957).	Giovanni	Sartori	continued	with	this	idea,	but	he	looked	at	the	effects	on	the	ideology	
of	parties,	when	the	number	of	parties	 increased.	He	measured	the	degree	of	polarisation	
that	was	created	when	more	parties	entered	the	spectrum.	Sartori	discovered	that	there	were	
centripetal	and	centrifugal	powers	that	made	the	parties	move	on	the	left	and	right	scale;	
moreover,	he	discovered,	just	as	Downs,	that	parties	move	more	to	the	extremes,	when	more	
parties	enter	the	spectrum	(Sartori,	1976).	As	both	conclude	that	when	more	parties	arise,	
the	 parties	 will	 move	 more	 towards	 the	 extremes	 of	 the	 spectrum,	 chances	 are	 that	 it	
becomes	more	difficult	to	form	coalitions.	This	 is	because	of	the	more	complex	consensus	
that	needs	to	be	created	between	the	potential	coalition	partners.	Another	option	is	that	the	
same	parties	always	form	the	coalitions	(Armstrong	&	Duch,	2010).	Depending	on	the	election	
results,	these	coalition	parties	are	likely	to	be	centre	parties	that	are	not	too	far	away	from	
each	other;	however,	they	could	also	be	a	block	on	the	left	or	the	right	side	of	the	spectrum,	
in	 which	 extreme	 parties	 could	 have	 a	 chance	 of	 governing.	 Deriving	 from	 the	
operationalisation	 of	 Downs	 and	 Sartori,	 party	 polarisation	 and	 fractionalisation	 are	 very	
similar;	however,	they	do	not	represent	the	same	phenomenon.		
Deriving	from	these	variables,	three	hypotheses	are	created:	
• H1:	the	higher	the	electoral	volatility	is,	the	longer	the	government	formation	period	
will	be.	
• H2:	the	 lower	the	number	of	seats	every	party	obtains,	the	 longer	the	government	
formation	period	will	be.	
• H3:	the	more	increase	of	the	level	of	party	polarisation,	the	longer	the	government	
formation	period	will	be.	
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Methods	and	Data	
The	following	part	will	display	the	operationalisation	of	the	concepts	that	are	described	
in	 the	 previous	 section;	 furthermore,	 the	 sources	 of	 the	 information	 will	 be	 presented.	
Deriving	 from	 this,	 the	 choices,	 considerations,	 limitations,	 and	 consequences	 will	 be	
discussed.	The	variables	that	will	be	employed	during	the	answering	of	the	research	question	
are:	 government	 formation,	 electoral	 volatility,	 fractionalisation,	 and	 polarisation.	
Additionally,	the	research	methods	will	be	presented	that	are	chosen	to	answer	the	research	
question.	
Operationalization	of	the	variables.		
The	 DV	 issue	 length	 of	 government	 formation.	 The	 DV	will	 be	 operationalised	 as	 the	
number	of	days	it	takes	from	the	day	of	the	election,	until	the	day	that	the	new	government	
is	presented	to	the	King,	by	whom	the	government	is	installed.	The	data	for	the	date	of	the	
election,	and	of	the	date	of	the	start	of	the	government	come	from	parlgov.org3.	
The	 first	 Independent	Variable	 (IV)	electoral	 volatility,	 is	 the	number	of	 seats	 that	has	
changed	colour	(Mair,	2008).	This	is	possible	to	calculate	after	the	elections	by	counting	of	all	
the	votes.	Because	the	number	of	seats	changed	in	1956,	from	100	seats	in	parliament	to	150	
seats,	the	variable	will	be	expressed	in	percentages.	The	data	for	this	variable	comes	from	
Vincenzo	 Emanuele4.	 In	 this	 dataset,	 Emanuele	 calculated	 the	 electoral	 volatility	 in	 three	
ways.	Firstly,	he	calculated	the	percentage	of	votes	that	changed	party	because	of	parties	
entering	 or	 leaving	 the	 parliament	 (RegV).	 Secondly,	 the	 percentage	 of	 seats	 changing	
between	parties	that	are	in	the	parliament	(AltV).	Lastly,	the	percentage	of	votes	that	switch	
between	parties	that	have,	in	the	previous,	and	the	current	election	obtained	less	than	1%	of	
the	votes	(OthV)	(Emanuele,	2017).	From	these	three	a	total	is	taken	(TV),	which	will	serve	as	
the	electoral	volatility	variable	value.			
	 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑉 + 𝐴𝑙𝑡𝑉 + 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑉 = 𝑇𝑣		| /012 /3 124 |56785978 : 	+	 |/;1</; 124 |5=78 : 	+	 |/;1</; 124 |5=78 : 	=	Tv	(Emanuele,	2017)	
																																																						
3	ParlGov	is	a	data	infrastructure	for	political	science	and	contains	information	for	all	EU	and	
most	OECD	democracies	(37	countries)	(Parlgov,	2018) 
4	https://cise.luiss.it/cise/dataset-of-electoral-volatility-and-its-internal-components-in-
western-europe-1945-2015/	
Thomas	Kortenbach	 Thesis	 NIU	1474590	
	 12	
	
The	second	IV	is	fractionalisation.	This	IV	will	be	calculated	following	the	model	by	Laakso	
and	 Taagepera	 (1979),	 the	 effective	 number	 of	 parties	 (ENP).	 This	 is	 a	 calculation	 of	 the	
weighted	strength	of	the	parties,	and	how	many	parties	would	be	in	parliament,	if	they	would	
all	have	the	same	size	 (Laakso	&	Taagepera,	1979).	Table	1	shows	examples	of	how	these	
results	can	vary,	when	the	number	of	parties	change,	or	their	share	of	the	votes.	The	result	
will	be	the	indicator	for	the	level	of	fragmentation.	The	measurement	provides	an	insight	in	
the	changes	over	time,	to	not	only	show	the	fractionalisation	of	the	parliament,	but	also	the	
distribution	of	the	seats	among	the	parties	(Laakso	&	Taagepera,	1979).	The	data	is	derived	
from	the	website	parlgov.org.	 	𝑁 = 1 𝑃;:B;C4 	
	
Number of parties Party 1 Party 2 Party 3 Party 4 Party 5 ENP 
2 .5 .5    2 
2 .75 .25    1.60 
3 .25 .35 .40   2.90 
4 .10 .03 .32 .55  2.41 
5 .15 .05 .25 .30 .25 4.17 
Table	1	Examples	of	ENP	results	with	different	number	of	parties,	and	varying	shares	of	votes.	
	
The	third	IV	is	party	system	polarisation.	Every	party	can	be	given	a	value	on	this	left	to	
right	scale.	It	is	common	that	the	value	0	is	extreme	left-wing,	and	the	value	10	is	extreme	
right-wing.	 The	 website	 parlgov.org	 has	 provided	 most	 of	 the	 parties	 in	 Europe	 with	 an	
ideological	value.	By	calculating	a	weighted5	average	party	polarisation,	for	all	the	parties	that	
have	 gained	 seats	 in	 parliament	 after	 an	 election,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 compare	 the	 level	 of	
polarisation	election	after	election.		
𝑆𝑖(𝑎 − 𝑃𝑖):BJ24 	
s	=	share	of	seats	
a	=	number	of	parties	
p	=	position	in	left-right	scale	
																																																						
5	Weighted	means	that	the	share	of	seats	is	taking	into	account	per	party.	Thus,	the	ideology	
of	the	party	is	multiplied	by	the	percentage	of	the	seats	that	the	party	has.		
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Research	methods.	
For	the	first	part	of	the	thesis’	research,	data	from	1948	until	2017	will	be	investigated.	
This	will	amount	to	21	elections	for	the	Dutch	national	parliament.	The	year	1948	is	chosen	
because	this	is	the	first	election	after	the	second	World	War,	of	the	national	parliament,	that	
has	 all	 the	 data	 complete.	 Furthermore,	 the	 election	 was	 vital	 because	 of	 the	 intended	
constitutional	 change	 (Parlement	&	 Politiek,	 2018g)6.	 In	 order	 to	 be	 able	 to	 compare	 the	
different	 years,	 the	 seats	 will	 have	 to	 be	 presented	 in	 percentages	 because	 from	 1956	
onwards	the	national	parliament	went	from	100	seats	to	150	seats.	(Parlement	&	Politiek,	
2018d).	The	study	will	employ	at	two-pronged	methodology.	Firstly,	the	quantitative	method	
will	be	a	generalised	least	squares	(GLS)	regression.	Because	it	is	a	time-series	regression,	the	
Prais-Winsten	and	Cochrane-Orcutt	regressions	is	used;	moreover,	a	rhotype	tsscorr	is	added.	
Prais	 uses	 the	 generalized	 least-squares	 method	 to	 estimate	 the	 parameters	 in	 a	 linear	
regression	 model	 in	 which	 the	 errors	 are	 serially	 correlated.	 Specifically,	 the	 errors	 are	
assumed	to	 follow	a	 first-order	autoregressive	process	 (Stata13,	2018).	A	 limitation	of	 the	
model	might	be	the	low	statistical	significance	of	the	correlation	coefficients,	due	to	the	small-
N.	 This	 result	will	 cause	 a	 smaller	 certainty	 that	 the	 relation	 that	 is	 observed	 because	 of	
random	 chance.	 This	 could	 be	 unfortunate,	 but	 will	 be	 supplemented	 by	 the	 following	
research	method.	
To	 discover	 the	 specific	 causal	mechanism	 accounting	 for	 differences	 in	 the	 length	 of	
government	formation,	secondly,	a	qualitative	research	method	is	used.	The	method	that	will	
be	employed	is	a	most	similar	system	design	(MSSD).	The	research	will,	firstly,	go	into	two	
cases	that	have	a	big	variation	in	the	IV	fractionalisation,	as	well	as	a	variation	in	the	DV.	By	
holding	the	variables	electoral	volatility	and	polarisation	constant,	it	is	possible	to	investigate	
if	the	variation	in	the	DV	is	due	to	the	change	in	fractionalisation.	The	cases	that	are	selected	
are	the	elections	of	2010	and	2017.	The	second	research	will	be	on	two	cases	where	the	values	
for	 the	electoral	volatility	have	a	big	difference,	as	well	as	 the	DV.	 In	 these	two	cases	 the	
variables	 fractionalisation	 and	 polarisation	 are	 held	 constant.	 By	 investigating	 these	 two	
																																																						
6	A	constitutional	change	was	necessary	for	the	transition	of	sovereignty	to	the	government	
of	Indonesia	(Parlement	&	Politiek,	2018g).		
Thomas	Kortenbach	 Thesis	 NIU	1474590	
	 14	
cases,	it	can	be	investigated	if	the	causal	mechanism	for	the	variation	in	the	DV	is	due	to	the	
change	in	electoral	volatility.	These	cases	will	be	the	elections	of	2006	and	20127.		
Year Government 
Formation 
(days) 
Electoral 
Volatility (%) 
Fractionalisat
ion 
Party System 
Polarisation 
2006 92 20,20 5,5 2,33 
2010 127 23,60 6,7 2,48 
2012 54 15,85 5,7 2,35 
2017 225 23,25 8,1 2,45 
Table	2	The	four	selected	cases	for	the	MSSD	research,	with	the	values	for	the	variables.	
Results	
The	next	section	of	the	thesis	will	display,	and	analyse,	the	data	and	results	of	the	two	
research	methods	 that	 are	 described	 above.	 The	 first	 research	method	 is	 the	 regression	
analysis	of	the	21	moments	in	time,	in	order	to	find	the	association	between	the	variables.	
The	second	research	method	is	a	MSSD	research	to	two	cases,	in	order	to	research	the	causal	
mechanism	between	the	variables.	
Before	going	into	the	regression	models,	it	is	important	to	look	at	the	distribution	of	
the	three	different	IVs	compared	to	the	DV.	As	is	visible	in	figure	1	below,	the	three	IVs	are	
quite	similarly	correlated	to	the	DV.	All	three	IVs	are	more	distributed	in	the	lower	half	of	the	
scatterplots,	 with	 a	 few	 outliers	 to	 the	 upper	 half	 of	 the	 scatterplots.	 From	 this	 can	 be	
concluded	that	the	regression	lines	are	likely	to	be	this	high	in	the	scatter	plots,	due	to	the	
high	value	of	the	outliers,	and	with	that	the	value	of	the	positive	residuals.	Furthermore,	the	
regression	 lines	 of	 all	 three	 IVs	 are	 positive,	 thus	when	 X	 (Volatility,	 Fractionalisation,	 or	
Polarisation)	increases,	Y	(Government	Formation	Length)	increases	as	well.	Additionally,	the	
regression	lines	of	all	three	IVs	have	relatively	similar	slopes.			
To	determine	if	there	is	multicollinearity	among	the	IVs,	a	correlation	calculation	has	
been	executed,	visible	in	appendix	B.	This	table	displays	that	it	is	difficult	to	determine	the	
partial	 effect	 of	 the	 IVs	 on	 the	 DV,	 as	 appendix	 B	 demonstrates	 that	 the	 IVs	 are	 highly	
correlated	with	each	other.	If	this	occurs,	there	is	a	risk	of	multicollinearity.	Multicollinearity	
																																																						
7	Unfortunately,	there	is	no	good	case	to	investigate	two	elections	where	the	polarisation	
variable	is	constant,	and	has	enough	variation	in	the	DV	and	other	IVs.	This	would	case	to	go	
back	in	time	to	much,	which	would	jeopardise	the	comparability	to	the	other	cases,	because	
of	too	many	alternative	explanations.		
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happens	when	the	correlation	is	higher	than	0.8	(Pollock,	2015).	As	is	visible	in	appendix	B,	
there	is	a	strong	correlation	between	electoral	volatility	and	polarisation	is	(r=.79),	as	well	as	
between	 fractionalisation	 and	 polarisation	 is	 (r=.71).	 These	 results	 are	 confirming	
multicollinearity	among	the	IVs.	Despite	the	fact	that	the	variables	are	theoretically	looking	
at	 three	 different	 causal	 mechanisms,	 from	 this	 can	 be	 concluded	 that	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	
determine	the	partial	effects	of	the	IVs	on	the	causal	mechanism.		
	
Figure	1	Scatterplots	of	the	three	independent	variables,	with	the	dependent	variable.	
When	moving	 to	 the	 regression	model	 (table	 3)	model	 1	 shows	 that	 the	 effect	 of	
electoral	 volatility	 has,	 as	 expected,	 a	 positive	 effect	 on	 the	 length	 of	 the	 government	
formation.	Changing	one	point	in	the	percentage	of	electoral	volatility	(the	variable	originally	
ranges	 from	4.8%	 to	31.3%)	 increases	 the	 length	of	government	 formation	 in	3	days.	The	
evidence	 is	 statistically	 significant	at	 the	10%	 level.	Model	2	 shows	 that,	 as	expected,	 the	
effect	 of	 fractionalisation	 is	 positive	 on	 the	 length	 of	 government	 formation,	 and	 is	
statistically	significant	on	the	10%	level.	Changing	one	point	in	the	degree	of	fractionalisation	
(the	variable	originally	ranges	from	3.5	to	8.1)	increases	the	length	of	government	formation	
in	18	days.	The	evidence	is	statistically	significant	at	the	10%	level.	Model	3	depicts	that	the	
effect	of	polarisation	is	positive	on	the	length	of	government	formation.	When	there	is	a	one-
point	increase	in	the	degree	of	polarisation	(the	variable	originally	ranges	from	1.58	to	2.48)	
the	length	of	government	formation	increases	with	73	days.	This	effect	is	significant	at	the	
10%	level.	In	Model	4,	the	level	of	electoral	volatility	and	the	degree	of	fractionalisation	are	
grouped	together.	Despite	the	two	coefficients	show,	as	expected,	a	positive	relationship	with	
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the	length	of	government	formation,	the	two	variables	fall	short	of	statistical	signification.	
The	high	 correlation	between	 the	 two	variables	 (r=.64),	 together	with	 the	 low	number	of	
observations	in	the	model,	may	well	be	explaining	this	lack	of	statistical	signification.	In	model	
5,	 the	 level	 of	 electoral	 volatility	 and	 the	 degree	 polarisation	 are	 pooled	 together.	 As	
anticipated,	 the	 two	 coefficients	 show	 a	 positive	 relationship	with	 the	 DV.	 However,	 the	
variables	fail	to	be	statistically	significant.	It	is	probable	that	this	is	due	to	the	high	correlation	
between	the	two	variables	 (r=.79),	and	the	 low	number	of	observations.	For	model	6,	 the	
degree	of	fractionalisation	and	the	degree	of	polarisation	are	entered.	Both	of	the	variables	
are,	 as	 expected,	 positively	 related	 to	 the	 length	of	 government	 formation.	Nevertheless,	
both	variables	are	not	statistically	significant.	This	is	likely	due	to	the	high	correlation	between	
the	two	variables	(r=.71),	and	the	low	number	of	observations.	In	model	7,	all	three	IVs	are	
grouped	 together.	 All	 three	 IVs	 remain	 positively	 correlated	 with	 the	 length	 of	 the	
government	formation;	however,	all	variables	still	fall	short	of	statistical	signification.		
	
 Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 
volatility 3.014+   1.913 1.828  1.533 
 (1.517)   (1.954) (2.521)  (2.590) 
fractionalisation  18.465+  10.946  10.928 9.559 
  (9.539)  (12.195)  (13.530) (13.898) 
polarisation   73.402+  37.424 42.730 16.383 
   (38.090)  (62.707) (53.932) (70.394) 
_cons 49.303* -3.606 -49.179 8.611 -5.665 -46.461 -10.289 
 (23.244) (49.677) (73.155) (50.998) (95.080) (73.774) (96.661) 
N 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
 + p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01 
Table	3	Summary	of	the	regression	models	1-7	
The	second	part	of	the	research	will	depth	into	some	specific	case-studies	in	order	to	
better	understand	the	dynamic	of	government	formation	and	the	causes	for	the	variation	in	
the	length.	All	the	cases	that	are	investigated	are	in	the,	what	is	called,	era	of	instability	(2002-
present)	(Parlement	&	Politiek,	2018i).		
Case	1:	Assessing	the	impact	of	fractionalisation	with	the	2010	and	the	2017	elections.	
The	first	 instance	will	 investigate	the	elections	of	2010	and	2017,	by	having	the	IVs	
electoral	volatility	and	polarisation	constant.	In	2010	the	electoral	volatility	was,	as	is	visible	
in	appendix	C,	23.6%,	and	in	2017	it	was	23.35%.	Moreover,	the	polarisation	is	also	almost	of	
the	same	value,	in	2010	at	2.48	and	in	2017	this	is	at	2.45.	In	2010	the	government	formation	
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took	127	days.	The	government	of	2010-2012	is	categorised	as	a	minority	government	in	the	
Senate,	with	 support	of	an	extra	party	 for	a	majority	 in	parliament	 (Parlement	&	Politiek,	
2018h).	In	2017	the	government	formation	took	225	days,	the	longest	government	formation	
since	the	second	World	War	(Parlement	&	Politiek,	2018a).	The	government	of	2017-present	
is	 categorised	as	 a	majority	 government	 in	both	Parliament	and	 the	Senate	 (Parlement	&	
Politiek,	2018h).	The	variable	that	varies	is	fractionalisation,	the	ENP.	In	2010	the	ENP	was	
6.7,	and	in	2017	at	8.1.		
As	 explained	 in	 the	 theoretical	 framework,	 a	 higher	 ENP	 is	 likely	 to	 require	more	
parties	to	form	a	majority	coalition	government,	as	the	parties	will	all	be	rather	small.	In	2010,	
10	parties	were	elected	into	parliament.	The	VVD	and	the	CDA	formed	the	government,	with	
support	of	the	PVV	in	Parliament	(Parlement	&	Politiek,	2018j).	All	these	parties	were	right-
wing	parties;	moreover,	because	the	PVV	only	supported	the	government,	they	had	a	smaller	
seat	at	the	negotiation	table.	Therefore,	the	negotiations	went	rather	quick,	as	the	parties	
had	similar	plans	for	the	coming	for	years.	In	2017,	13	parties	were	elected	into	government.	
This	increase	in	parties,	of	which	many	were	of	about	the	same	size,	required	the	government	
formation	to	take	place	with	four	parties.	Initially,	the	negotiations	started	with	VVD,	CDA,	
D66,	 and	 GroenLinks;	 however,	 after	 100	 days	 GroenLinks	 ceased	 to	 be	 part	 of	 the	
negotiations	 because	 of	 fundamental	 ideological	 differences.	 The	 negotiations	 continued	
with	the	VVD,	CDA,	D66,	and	the	CU	and	managed	to	complete	the	government	formation	
(Parlement	&	Politiek,	2018b).	Another	complicating	 factor	was	 that	prior	 to	 the	elections	
most	of	the	parties8	already	declared	that,	regardless	of	the	outcome,	they	would	not	want	
to	get	into	a	coalition	with	the	PVV.	This	caused	some	unrest,	especially	among	the	supporters	
of	the	PVV	because	they	deemed	it	undemocratic,	and	confirmed	their	believes	about	the	
political	establishment	(NOS,	2017).	The	PVV	ended	up	being	the	second	biggest	party	of	the	
elections,	with	20	seats	(Parlement	&	Politiek,	2018b).	By	excluding	this	many	seats,	it	became	
much	more	 difficult	 to	 find	 a	 formation	 that	 had	 a	majority	 in	 both	 the	 Senate	 and	 the	
Parliament	(NOS,	2017).	By	excluding	the	possibility	of	forming	a	coalition	with	the	PVV	before	
the	 elections,	most	 parties	 formed	 some	 form	of	 pre-election	 coalition.	Not	 in	 the	 actual	
																																																						
8	Every	party,	except	for	50Plus,	VNL,	and	Forum	voor	Democratie,	have	excluded	the	PVV	
(Telegraaf,	2017).	
Thomas	Kortenbach	 Thesis	 NIU	1474590	
	 18	
definition	of	the	concept9,	but	an	adaptation	of	it,	in	which	the	parties	collectively	stated	that	
they	will	not	govern	with	this	one	party.			
Judging	from	these	two	government	formations,	it	can	be	concluded	that	the	causal	
mechanism	 is	 that	when	 there	 are	more	 parties	 that	 need	 to	 partake	 in	 the	 government	
formation	 to	 form	 a	majority,	 the	 government	 formation	will	 take	 longer.	Moreover,	 the	
necessity	for	more	parties	in	a	government	is	likely	to	create	a	situation	where	parties	that	
are	 ideologically	 further	apart	will	get	 into	a	government	formation	together.	As	the	2017	
government	formation	has	illustrated,	this	is	not	easily	accomplished.	Another	difference	is	
that	in	2017	they	wanted	to	create	a	majority	government,	where	in	2010	they	sufficed	with	
a	minority	government	(Parlement	&	Politiek,	2018j)	(Parlement	&	Politiek,	2018b).	It	clearly	
requires	more	parties	to	participate	in	the	negotiations	to	form	a	majority	government,	when	
many	parties	are	of	relative	same	size.	Thus,	the	causal	mechanism	of	a	higher	ENP	that	will	
lead	to	a	longer	government	formation,	is	in	place;	nevertheless,	it	cannot	be	ignored	that	it	
is	a	complicating	factor	to	form	majority	government	coalitions,	when	a	big	party	is	expelled	
from	forming	a	government	with	the	other	big	parties.	This	is	likely	to	affect	the	length	of	the	
government	formation	negatively.			
Case	 2:	 Assessing	 the	 impact	 of	 electoral	 volatility	 with	 the	 2006	 and	 the	 2012	
elections.	
The	second	instance	investigates	the	elections	of	2006	and	2012,	where	the	impact	of	
the	variable	electoral	 volatility	on	 the	 length	of	 government	 formation	 is	 researched.	The	
other	 two	 IVs,	 fractionalisation	 and	 polarisation	 are	 kept	 constant.	 The	 degree	 of	
fractionalisation	 was,	 in	 2006,	 at	 5.5,	 and	 in	 2012,	 at	 5.7.	 Additionally,	 the	 degree	 of	
polarisation	was	very	similar	in	both	cases.	In	2006,	the	degree	of	polarisation	was	2.33,	and	
in	2012	at	2.35.	While	these	values	are	very	similar,	the	variation	in	the	DV	is	very	big.	In	2006,	
the	government	formation	took	92	days.	In	2012,	the	government	formation	took	54	days.	
The	government	of	2006	is	categorised	as	a	majority	government;	however,	from	2010	it	lost	
its	majority	due	to	the	revoked	support	of	the	PVDA.	The	government	of	2012	is	categorised	
as	a	majority	government;	nevertheless,	they	did	not	have	a	majority	in	the	Senate	(Parlement	
																																																						
9	“A	pre-electoral	coalition	exists	when	multiple	parties	choose	to	co-ordinate	their	electoral	
strategies	rather	than	run	for	office	alone”	(Golder,	2006,	p.	195).	
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&	Politiek,	2018h).	The	difference	in	these	two	cases	is	the	electoral	volatility.	In	2006,	20.2%	
electoral	volatility	was	recorded,	where	in	2012	only	15.85%	was	recorded.		
As	is	described	in	the	theoretical	framework,	when	there	is	an	increase	in	the	electoral	
volatility,	it	is	likely	to	have	an	effect	on	the	length	of	the	government	formation,	as	there	are	
many	new	people	to	politics.	 In	2006,	the	electoral	volatility	was	at	20.2%.	After	the	2006	
elections,	 two	new	parties	entered	the	parliament.	Firstly,	 the	anti-immigration	party,	 the	
PVV,	entered	the	parliament	with	nine	seats.	This	is	a	high	entry	for	a	new	party.	Secondly,	
the	animal	rights	party,	the	PvdD,	entered	with	two	seats	in	parliament	(Parlement	&	Politiek,	
2018k).	The	electoral	volatility,	after	the	elections	of	2012,	was	substantially	lower,	15.85%.	
After	the	elections,	only	one	new	party	entered	parliament.	This	was	the	50plus	party,	the	
senior	party,	which	entered	with	two	seats.	After	the	2006	elections,	there	was	not	only	a	
higher	entry	of	new	parties,	but	as	well	a	much	higher	succession	of	Parliament	members,	
compared	to	2012.	In	2006,	70	people	of	the	previous	term	did	not	return,	compared	to	46	
after	 the	 2012	 election	 (Parlement	&	Politiek,	 2018l).	 This	means	 that	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 the	
negotiations	have	been	held	by	less	experienced	Parliament	members	in	2006	than	in	2012,	
which	would	likely	prolong	the	government	formation	period.		
The	government	formation	attempt	in	2006	was	initially	started	with	CDA,	PVDA,	and	
SP	because	these	parties	were	the	three	biggest,	after	the	election.	SP	had	gained	16	seats	in	
the	elections,	thus	many	new	parliament	members.	Rather	quick,	after	25	days,	 it	became	
clear	 that	 the	 SP	 could	 not	 cooperate	 in	 a	 government,	 due	 to	 too	 different	 ideologies	
(Parlement	&	Politiek,	2018m).	This	forced	the	CDA	and	PVDA	to	search	for	another	party,	to	
form	a	majority	government.	They	found	this	support	in	the	CU.	The	CU	had	doubled	in	size	
after	 the	 elections.	 This	 combination	 of	 parties	 proved	 to	 be	 fruitful	 as	 a	 government	
coalition,	and	after	a	total	of	89	days	the	new	government	was	 installed.	The	government	
formation	of	 2012	was	one	of	 the	quickest	 formations,	 after	 the	 Second	World	War.	 The	
government	formation	only	took	47	days	(Parlement	&	Politiek,	2018p).	After	the	elections,	
the	two	biggest	parties,	the	VVD	and	PVDA,	were	perceived	as	the	most	viable	option	for	a	
coalition.	Both	parties	had	gained	seats10;	however,	both	parties	are	well	established	in	the	
Parliament,	thus	lack	of	experience	would	not	be	as	big	of	a	problem	for	them.			
																																																						
10	The	VVD	gained	10	seats,	the	PVDA	gained	8	seats	(Parlement	&	Politiek,	2018o).		
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Concluding	from	both	government	formations,	it	can	be	concluded	that	especially	the	
inexperience	of	the	participants	in	the	government	formation,	in	2006	the	SP11,	has	been	a	
contributing	factor	to	the	extension	of	the	government	formation.	Despite	the	fact	that	both	
of	the	government	formations	were	still	under	the	average	of	government	formations12.	This	
means	that	the	causal	mechanism	was	not	only	that	the	increase	in	electoral	volatility	lead	to	
a	 longer	 government	 formation,	 but	 a	 related	 feature	 of	 too	 many	 new	 members	 of	
Parliament.	Moreover,	as	official	reason	why	the	SP	ceased	the	government	formation,	was	
that	the	SP	could	not	continue	because	of	incompatible	ideas	for	the	coalition	(Parlement	&	
Politiek,	2018m).	This	means	that	the	ideologies	of	the	parties	were	too	far	apart,	which	was	
probably	easier	to	overcome	in	2012	between	just	two	parties.		
Conclusion		
This	 paper	 aimed	 at	 finding	 the	 causal	 mechanism	 that	 determines	 the	 length	 of	
government	 formations	 in	 the	Netherlands.	 This	 has	 been	 attempted	 by	 looking	 at	 three	
variables	that	have	been	on	the	rise,	since	the	de-pillarization	of	the	end	of	the	1960s.	The	
three	 variables	 are	 electoral	 volatility,	 fractionalisation,	 and	 polarisation.	 By	 using	 a	
quantitative	 approach,	 it	 has	 been	 demonstrated	 that	 all	 three	 variables	 have	 a	 positive	
correlation	with	the	length	of	government	formations.	Furthermore,	all	three	variables	had	
statistical	signification	at	the	10%	level.	With	a	sample	of	21	observations,	the	hypotheses	can	
be	accepted.	As	is	stated	above,	the	following	four	models	stop	to	be	statistically	significant.	
Moreover,	from	the	first	three	models,	it	does	not	become	undisputedly	clear	what	factor	is	
affecting	the	length	of	the	government	formation	the	most.	One	of	the	main	issues	is	that	the	
three	 variables	 are	 on	different	measurement	 scales,	which	makes	 it	 difficult	 to	 compare	
them.	
In	 order	 to	 complement	 the	 findings	 from	 the	 quantitative	 analysis,	 a	 qualitative	
research	has	been	executed.	For	this	qualitative	research	a	MSSD	design	was	selected.	In	both	
of	the	instances,	the	DV	of	one	of	the	elections	was	almost	twice	as	big	as	the	other	election.	
This	means	 that	 the	 variation	 in	 the	 IV	 had,	 possible,	 a	 large	 effect	 on	 the	 length	 of	 the	
																																																						
11	The	2006	government	formation	was	the	SP’s	first	government	formation,	their	
negotiators	were	new	to	the	procedure	(Parlement	&	Politiek	,	2018q).	
12	The	average	length	of	government	formations,	after	the	Second	World	War,	is	90	days.		
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government	 formation.	 The	 first	 instance,	 researching	 the	 impact	 fractionalisation	 on	 the	
length	of	government	formation,	showed	that	with	a	higher	number	of	effective	parties	 it	
becomes	more	challenging	to	find	enough	parties	to	form	a	coalition.	However,	this	was	not	
only	 due	 to	 actual	 increase	 in	 number	 of	 parties	 that	 were	 necessary	 to	 for	 a	 majority	
coalition,	but	also	because	of	the	bigger	ideological	gap	between	the	parties.	Thus,	the	second	
remark	points	towards	the	impact	that	polarisation	can	have	on	the	length	of	government	
formation	as	well.	Even	though,	polarisation	remained	constant	for	the	whole	parliament,	this	
can	 still	 be	 a	 disrupting	 feature	 for	 the	 government	 formations.	 In	 the	 second	 instance,	
researching	 the	 impact	 of	 electoral	 volatility	 on	 the	 length	 of	 government	 formation,	 the	
example	showed	that	when	there	are	more	new	members	of	parliament	after	an	election,	it	
becomes	more	difficult	for	the	negotiating	parties	to	make	quick	decisions	in	the	negotiations.	
Nevertheless,	electoral	volatility	does	seem	to	have	a	smaller	impact	prolonging	effect	on	the	
length	 of	 government	 formation,	 than	 in	 the	 first	 instance,	 when	 the	 degree	 of	
fractionalisation	and	polarisation	is	smaller.	
To	answers	the	research	question:	What	factors	affect	the	length	of	the	government	
formation	of	a	national	government?	These	case	studies	have	not	conclusively	proven	what	
factor	affects	the	length	of	government	formation	the	most.	However,	they	have	proven	that	
when	 there	 is	 a	 less	 stable	 parliament,	 with	many	 parties	 and	many	 new	members,	 the	
government	formation	does	take	substantially	longer.	It	is	therefore	possible	to	conclude	that	
for	 all	 three	 factors,	 when	 increasing,	 do	 contribute	 to	 a	 longer	 government	 formation.	
Nevertheless,	 this	conclusion	cannot	completely	 justify	 that	the	alteration	 in	the	 length	of	
government	formation	is	solely	due	to	these	three	factors,	other	factors	can	play	part	in	the	
events	and	creation	of	the	government.		
This	 thesis	 has	 researched	 the	 connection	 between	 the	 length	 of	 government	
formation	 in	 the	 Netherlands,	 and	 the	 factors	 electoral	 volatility,	 fractionalisation,	 and	
polarisation.	 As	 research	 method	 for	 the	 quantitative	 part,	 a	 time	 series	 regression	 was	
chosen	to	investigate	the	correlations	between	the	DV	and	the	IVs.	A	limitation	of	this	time	
series	 design,	 is	 that	 there	 is	 a	 low	 external	 validity	 because	 the	 correlations	 that	 are	
discovered	are	very	specific	 to,	 in	 this	case,	 the	Netherlands.	This	 is	not	necessarily	a	bad	
thing.	As	explained	before,	it	would	be	difficult	to	compare	this	research	to	other	countries,	
as	there	would	be	many	alternative	explanations,	such	as	the	electoral	system	and	the	party	
systems.	Furthermore,	if	there	would	have	been	more	observations	that	had	all	the	data,	the	
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p-value	probably	would	have	been	higher.	This	has	made	it	difficult	to	prove	the	partial	effect	
of	the	three	variables	on	the	DV	without	needing	to	consider	the	effect	of	the	other	variables,	
as	 well	 as	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 three	 IVs	 were	 highly	 correlated,	 which	 made	 it	 difficult	 to	
determine	the	partial	effect	of	the	IVs.		
Despite	 the	 evidence	 found,	 the	 present	 research	 may	 raise	 some	 concerns	 that	
further	research	should	address.	For	example,	further	research	could	go	more	in	depth	in	the	
exclusion	of	coalition	possibilities,	prior	to	the	elections.	By	investigating	the	‘actual’	ENP	that	
are	 eligible	 for	 coalition	 government	 formation,	 it	 can	 be	 researched	 if	 alteration	 to	 the	
electoral,	or	parliamentary	system,	should	be	made.	From	this	research	recommendations	
can	be	made	to	more	actively	make	pre-election	coalitions.	As	Golder	has	discovered,	when	
party	 systems	 become	more	 polarised,	 pre-election	 coalitions	 occur	 more	 often	 (Golder,	
2006).	Another	possibility	that	could	be	researched,	is	whether	minority	governments	are	as	
effective	 as	 majority	 governments	 because	 if	 that	 is	 the	 case,	 the	 coalition	 government	
formation	 can	 take	more	 formations	 after	 an	 election.	 Lastly,	 the	 same	 research	 can	 be	
conducted	 on	 a	 different	 country,	 with	 a	 different	 institutional	 design,	 but	 without	
immediately	 comparing	 it	 to	 this	 research	 on	 the	 Netherlands.	 This	 new	 research	 could	
discover	how	these	variables	are	correlated,	and	what	causal	mechanisms	would	be	in	place	
in,	for	example,	a	majoritarian	system	such	as	the	United	Kingdom.			
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Appendix		
	
Appendix	A		
Abbreviations  
Christen Democratisch Appel      CDA 
ChristenUnie        CU 
Dependent Variable       DV 
Democraten ’66       D66 
Effective Number of Parties      ENP 
European Union       EU 
Independent Variable       IV 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OECD 
Partij van de Arbeid       PVDA 
Partij voor de Dieren       PvdD 
Partij voor de Vrijheid      PVV 
VoorNederland       VNL 
Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie    VVD 
	
Appendix	B	
	
Obs=21	 Volatility	 Fractionalisation	 Polarisation	
Volatility	 1.0000	 	 	
Fractionalisation	 0.6402	 1.0000	 	
Polarisation	 0.7879	 0.7140	 1.0000	
Table	4	Correlation	between	the	three	IVs.	
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Appendix	C	
	
Year	 Government	
formation	(days)	
Electoral	
Volatility	%	
Fractionalisation	 Party	System	
Polarisation	
1948	 31	 6,55	 4,7	 1,76	
1952	 69	 6,30	 4,7	 1,69	
1956	 25	 4,80	 4,1	 1,62	
1959	 68	 6,45	 4,1	 1,58	
1963	 70	 5,80	 4,5	 1,65	
1967	 49	 12,00	 5,7	 1,67	
1971	 40	 13,50	 6,4	 1,74	
1972	 163	 11,80	 6,4	 1,91	
1977	 208	 13,00	 3,7	 1,70	
1981	 108	 8,90	 4,3	 1,78	
1982	 57	 8,60	 4,0	 1,88	
1986	 54	 11,05	 3,5	 1,60	
1989	 62	 5,45	 3,8	 1,64	
1994	 111	 22,20	 5,4	 1,84	
1998	 89	 16,90	 4,8	 1,97	
2002	 68	 31,30	 5,8	 2,23	
2003	 123	 16,55	 4,7	 2,00	
2006	 92	 20,20	 5,5	 2,33	
2010	 127	 23,60	 6,7	 2,48	
2012	 54	 15,85	 5,7	 2,35	
2017	 225	 23,25	 8,1	 2,45	
Table	5	Data	for	the	quantitative	research.	
	
	
	
	
	
